

Significant Points in Secretary McNamara's
Testimony to the Stennis Committee

McNamara

Concur

Dissent

A) Air
Objectives: 1) to reduce the flow and/or
increase the cost of infiltration
of men and supplies

2) raise the morale of the
South Vietnamese people

3) make clear to Hanoi that
they would have to pay a
price in North for their
aggression in South

B.) Bombing is a supplement
and not a substitute for
effective campaign in South.

ON FILE OSD RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

The limitations of the air campaign =
three topics

- 1) the objectives & achievements of air war
- 2) target recommendations & JCS &
extent to which they are followed
- 3.) the proposals of the hawks:
 - a) that bombing can bring DRV to the table
 - b) " " can prevent flow of
supplies into or through DRV

C.) The campaign has been successful:

- raised morale in the South
- put a high price on aggression
- made infiltration more difficult and costly

D.) Complete interdiction has never been considered possible

E.) DRV's war-making ability is dependent on imports of military goods & moving them South — the capacity of the transport system is very large and traffic is very small — 15 tons per day in a pipeline with an output of 200 tons/day.

- F.) DRV has had to divert some 500,000 people to cope with air attacks
- G.) Bunking campaign is hurting DRV's war-making capability
- H.) No campaign, short of one with population as target can force Hanoi into submission
- I.) We strive constantly to maximize the cost of infiltration + to improve our air power — but no improvements can do much more than put a high price tag on aggression.

Topic II - JCS Target Recommendations

A. OTL has 427 targets.
of which 68 not recommended.
Of 359, strikes authorized
against 302 (85% of total)
On 57 of JCS recommended
targets have not been authorized.

B. Strikes against the 57 will
not materially shorten the
war.

Shaype says it will
Wheeler says they
are worthwhile

C. Of 57 -

7 seen by JCS of little value
9 are P4 facilities -
25 lesser targets in pop areas.
4 significant " "
3 ports
4 airfields
5 buffer zone

D. For a few of these targets
the risks of confrontation exceed
military advantages.

Approved For Release 2001/11/19 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000700020006-8
be considered but they cannot
even different objectives than those we have.

Topic III

Hanoi's proposals —

They would change our objectives:

They believe air power can break the will or cut off supplies. They see air as a substitute rather than supplement

Breaking the Will

No evidence in intelligence reports that new campaign can break the will.

Indeed anger at US air attacks helps maintain popular support of Hanoi

Course of ground war, rather than scale of air attack is determining factor in "breaking will"

Cutting Supplies

Capacity of LOCs and
outside sources of supply
so exceeds the mined
flows necessary to sustain
war at present levels that
they cannot be stopped
by air attacks.

Closing of Sea & Land Routes

Would interfere seriously
with imports but the
essentials needed to
fight war are so small
15-25 tons a day v. actual
imports of 5000 / + capacity
of 1400

Military equipment
comes by rail 550 tons
a day

If Haiphong close
Land routes could
move 8400 tons a day

If land routes reduced
50% they move 70 percent
of current imports.

Elim. of Haiphong would
not eliminate ~~sea~~ imports.
as witnessed by Pt strikes.

Bombing ports & mining
harbors leads only to
total reliance on land
so would not be an
effective means of stopping
infiltration of supplies
to GVN

A less discriminate program
can do no more than
our present careful program
to slow ~~infiltration~~
would it "break the will"

A less selective system
would involve risks too high
to accept for its intrinsic
prospects

Mining the harbors would
be an act of war in int'l law sense

Closing of ports could induce
strong & unpredictable Soviet
reaction — increasing its
support of DRV... w/ better
weapons, w/ volunteers
hurt US-Soviet relations, UN,
or even direct Soviet intervention

Final decision is in the Souths

Issues raised

Mc- There is not a direct relationship between level of bombing + force response in the south.

Would an campaign have been more efficient w/out restrictions + would it have reduced casualties in the South

It would not have reduced casualties

Bombing targets earlier would not have reduced flow of men + material altho it would have increased the cost somewhat.

The difference in price to DRV would have been small -- $\frac{5}{44}$ million

We would have suffered greater losses if we went after the new targets earlier (we have learned new tactics, better equipment for jamming, etc.)

Red China will come in -
if they saw the destruction
of govt of North Vietnam or denial
of independence

Even though 85% of goods come
from Hawaii military + milty
supporting is so small
that you can have a dramatic
reduction in total imports
w/out affecting war material

15 hrs a day seems small
but it is agreed intelligence

p.697
In terms of \$ aid,
670 million from USSR
120? 150 from China

We could win war w/out
cutting off supplies from USSR
Don't know how to do it
Would create serious
military risks

He runs thru the 57, decides
their importance, says he
won't risk lives on them —
YET they come up on
THE NEW LISTS

We have destroyed 85 MIGS
lost only 23 to MIGS
(12 in last year

* Hapthony isn't the entry
point for 85% of war material.
About 100% of it comes by
land

The senators believe more
effective air & sea power
can shorten the war

A CIA report says
morale is holding up
and we can't break
or weaken it by bombing
(16 Aug)

Increasing sorties won't
reduce casualties in
South; not sure of reducing
them well - since the
size of flow of supplies
to South from North
is not bombing but
the loc's in Laos &
within South Vietnam

Wheeler &
McConnell disagree

The campaign has
not reduced flow to
South to point that
no more than present
levels of enemy forces
in South has been maintained
over last 18 months

(also CIA/DA monthly
(thru 18 July)

436
42
872
1744

McC - 95%

Sharp - 58%
42%

Mac = 95% of JCS

Share = 42 58% of JCS + CinCPac

436 187.00
1744
1260

436

of which not struck = 187

of not authorized = 107

427

427
242
185

436

107

329 = authorized

As of Tuesday -

359 recommended

85% 302 authorized

> not anywhere
near 436
recommended

359

+ 68 not recommended

427 = total list of chiefs = operating target list

McCannell

continues JCS/CINCPAC Target List as of 21 Aug =

361 of which 94 not authorized

✓ Truck inventory per DIA

Feb 1965 = 9,000

Current 10-12,000

after we destroy 4,000 and
damaged 4,000

Of the 57 targets
only a small number
are very important and a
substantiated number of
them would be considered
very unimportant

Mac says most of
the power plants they
are not attempting
to reconstruct